Bargaining over two issues as a bundle permits credible cheap talk about their relative importance even when interests are directly opposed on each issue. The resulting communication gains can exceed the gains from bundling previously identified in the monopoly pricing literature. 
. Introduction
In multi-issue bargaining both sides can benefit by compromising on the issues they care least about in exchange for a better deal on the issues they care most about. But in an asymmetric information environment there is no assurance that the parties have either the incentive or the credibility to communicate which issues to compromise on.
We analyze this problem in a 'take it or leave it' bargaining game where an offerer proposes concessions on two issues to an offeree after listening to messages sent by the offeree. When the issues are bargained over separately we find that the offeree will lie about which issue is of greater importance so communication is not credible. This communication problem can be solved by bundling the two issues together in a single offer that must be accepted or rejected in its entirety.
The communication in our model is non-verifiable 'cheap talk. ' The cheap-talk literature shows that some signals can be credible if sender and receiver interests are partly aligned (Crawford and Sobel, 1982) , but in our model the two sides' interests are directly opposed on each issue. Considered separately, the offeree has an incentive to lie about the importance of each issue. But if both issues must be accepted or rejected together, a comparative statement about which issue is better can be credible because it simultaneously reveals favorable information about one issue and unfavorable information about the other issue.
A standard result of the monopoly pricing literature is that bundling multiple goods together can increase a monopolist's profits because buyer valuations of a bundle are more predictable than buyer valuations of individual goods (Stigler, 1963; Adams and Yellen, 1976; McAfee et al., 1989) . This same logic clearly applies to our model of multi-issue bargaining. The communication gains we identify are in addition to the standard benefits of bundling previously identified in the monopoly pricing literature.
. The model
We consider a game between two players, A and B, bargaining over two issues, 1 and 2. Player B has private information v [ [0,1] relevant to his value for each issue k. Let v 5 (v , v ) . We suppose
that v has continuous density f, and distribution
We model the potential for communication under two different bargaining protocols. Under the first protocol, each offer can be accepted or rejected separately. Under the second protocol, the players either reach agreement on both issues or on none. We use the term 'no bundling' to refer to the first protocol and 'bundling' to refer to the second. Notice that, for a fixed protocol, the timing structure states that the offer x has to be optimal given player A's inference about v upon hearing m. This distinguishes our cheap talk model from a screening problem where player A first commits to a menu of offers and player B chooses among them, with or without sending messages.
Given a realization v of player B's private information and concessions x by player A, the payoffs for each player from reaching agreement on issue k are equal to
for player A and
We assume that g is twice differentiable and strictly increasing in each argument. Payoffs are additive across issues and we denote by U 5 U 1 U the total payoffs for i [ hA,Bj.
For each player there is a common outside opportunity equal to 0 for each issue k. We assume that 1 Our results depend only U being strictly decreasing in x, not on its linearity. We provide three different examples of the function g below. In example 1 there is no interaction between the realized uncertainty and the offeree's marginal benefit of a concession on the issue. It corresponds to the standard linear and additively separable utility function that is usually considered in the literature on bundling by a multi-product monopolist. In example 2, player B's utility is supermodular in the unknown parameter v and the concession x. In example 3, player B's utility is submodular in v and x.
]
.1. Babbling
Since we model communication as cheap talk, there is always a babbling equilibrium under either bargaining protocol where A refuses to ascribe any meaning to B's message m and makes her offers accordingly.
In a babbling equilibrium under no bundling, for each issue k [ h1,2j, player A chooses the concession x such that
In contrast, in a babbling equilibrium under bundling, player A chooses the concessions x to solve We do not provide a general characterization of babbling equilibria in this note but turn now to the existence of an informative equilibrium.
.2. Rank-revealing equilibrium
We consider the possibility that B might credibly disclose his ordinal ranking of the different issues, i.e., whether v . v or vice versa, without disclosing anything about the magnitude of either v or v . We call such an informative equilibrium a rank-revealing equilibrium (RRE). We show below that, under a fairly general set of conditions, there does not exist a RRE unless bundling is allowed. We assume without loss of generality that v $ v so that issue 1 is more valuable to B than issue 2. 
where F ( ? ) is the distribution of v given v $ v . Let f ( ? ) be the density associated with F ( ? ).
Since the objective function is continuous, problem (3) must have a solution x . Moreover, the k ] solution must be interior, i.e., x [ (x,x), k [ h1,2j. To see this note that, if x #x then the offer is ] ] Moreover, since v(x) 5 0 when x , 1, the derivative of the objective function at x 5x is 2 (1 2
] ] x)v (x) , 0 so that an offer slightly less than x dominates an offer of x.
At an interior solution we must have v(x ) [ (0,1) for all k [ h1,2j. Moreover, x must satisfy the k k first-order necessary condition for an interior maximum:
and, furthermore, the left-hand side of (4) must be non-increasing in x at x . Assume that (4) has a
Since v(x ) [ (0,1) and
for all v [ (0,1), we have a contradiction. Since x , x clearly B will lie for any v and v if the marginal value of a concession is higher for 1 2 1 2 higher v (supermodular g). The following shows that the problem is more general in that for any g there are always some realizations of v and v such that B will lie. For B to reveal the ranking truthfully it is sufficient that whenever v $ v ,
We consider two cases:
Claim 2. If g is supermodular (respectively, submodular), then there exists a RRE with x . x (resp., 1 2
x , x ), when B can only accept or reject the bundle.
2
Proof. Suppose g is supermodular. Then, for (6) to hold for all v . v it is sufficient that x . x . increasing the probability of agreement without increasing the total concessions in the event of agreement. And if x 5 x 5 x then we must have x .x (otherwise agreement will be reached with 1 2 ] zero probability) and x , 1 (otherwise agreement leaves A with no surplus). But then there existś . 0 such that an offer x 5 x 1´and x 5 x 2´will increase the probability of agreement without 1 2 increasing the total concessions in the event of agreement. The symmetric argument applies to the case where g is submodular. h
With bundling A wants to increase the probability of agreement by raising the total value of the offer to B for any given amount of concessions x 1 x . B has an incentive to help A do this by 1 2 revealing the ranking. When g is supermodular, the value v and the concession x are complements from B's perspective and A concedes more on the more valuable issue to increase the probability of acceptance. On the other hand, when g is submodular, the value v and the concession x are substitutes from B's perspective and A concedes more on the less valuable issue to increase the probability of acceptance.
A is better off in an informative RRE with bundling compared to the babbling equilibrium with bundling because she can enforce the same outcome in both cases and has more information in a RRE. However, A's expected payoff in a RRE with bundling is not always higher than her expected payoff in the babbling equilibrium under no bundling. That is, the gain from communication need not be greater than the flexibility allowed by separate bargaining. Similar remarks apply to B's ex-ante expected payoffs from different protocols. Without bundling Country B will not reveal which region is preferred, so each region is treated identically by Country A. Country A trades off the probability of acceptance, which is increasing in the concession offer, with the gain if the offer is accepted, which is decreasing in the offer. Solving problem (1), x 5 0.5 for each region so the offer on region k is accepted when v $ 0.5 as seen in Fig.   k 
1(a).
With bundling but without communication, from (2) the optimal offer is x 5 0.564 on each region and the bundle is accepted if v 1 v $ 0.887 as seen in Fig. 1(b) . This increases payoffs for the same
. Conclusion
Two areas for further research are the existence of equilibria more informative than the rank revealing equilibrium and the existence of a rank revealing equilibrium for larger numbers of issues. The latter question is of particular interest since the monopoly pricing literature has shown that the gains from bundling large numbers of products can be substantial (Armstrong, 1999; Bakos and Brynjolfsson, 1999) . The rank order of issues becomes very informative as the number of issues increases so the communication gains from bundling are also likely to be significant.
